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This paper considers the measurement of performance in public service provision in an 
international context. It first sets out the measurement issues in general terms. The paper 
then applies these methods to estimate labour productivity in the education sector 
comparing the UK experience with that in the US from the mid 1990s. The results suggest 
reasonable labour productivity growth in UK education over this time period and show the 
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1  Introduction 
This paper considers the issue of measuring performance in the provision of public 
services. Frequently studies use volume of output measures such as number of students 
educated or numbers of medical interventions. An earlier paper (O’Mahony, Stevens and 
Stokes, 2002) set out the arguments for and against using information on final outcomes to 
measure the services provided, such as increases in average years of life due to medical 
interventions or lifetime earnings arising from education. It concluded that there were 
strong theoretical arguments in favour of using outcome information rather than relying 
solely on outputs. This was based on the argument that the lack of market valuations 
(prices), exacerbated by incomplete information, suggests final outcomes may yield a more 
accurate measure of the effectiveness of the services provided. But the paper also pointed 
out that in practice it may be very difficult to implement an outcome based measure, in 
particular to adequately take account of factors that affect outcomes but are extraneous to 
the service provider. Examples are lifestyle changes that increase life expectancy or 
technological changes that increase the effectiveness of particular types of skilled labour. 
The purpose of this paper is a first attempt to implement an outcome approach and to   
compare performance across countries in the provision of public services. The application 
chosen is education, arguably the easiest service to measure in an international context. 
Nevertheless this paper will show that there are a number of practical problems that need 
to be resolved. The paper’s primary concern is to derive a measure of relative productivity 
performance for the entire education sector, to complement research carried comparing 
performance in services in the private sector (O’Mahony and deBoer, 2001). International 
comparisons are an important benchmark in examining performance and may often yield 
more insights than comparisons across time for a single country alone. The former is useful  3
in evaluating the extent to which different systems of provision impact on performance 
whereas the latter is most useful in examining the impact of within country changes. There 
is also an issue relating to expectations on the magnitudes of increases in service provision 
or productivity over time. O’Mahony and DeBoer (2001) show that growth rates vary 
considerably across sectors, with manufacturing showing on average more than 2% growth 
in output per hour worked between 1989 and 1999, whereas services sectors such as 
financial and business services achieved no more than 1% in the same period. Hence 
International comparisons can also aid in benchmarking expectations on what is 
achievable.  
The next section briefly sets out the measurement issues in general terms and 
presents a measure of performance to be applied to the education sector. The main body of 
the paper then applies this method to the education sector with a view to estimating labour 
productivity growth rates comparing the UK and the US in the second half of the 1990s. It 
begins by describing the output volume data available for the UK, underlying the estimates 
of output growth in the UK National Accounts. This section also examines information 
from an outcome measure, test score results, that is frequently employed in evaluating 
performance across producing units. We argue that this measure is sensitive to weights on 
the various test score results and so does not as yet provide a practical alternative to output 
measures. Methods employed to measure earnings outcomes are set out in section four and 
regression results for both countries are presented. Section five employs the resulting 
estimates on lifetime earnings to estimate outcome based measures of aggregate education 
services for the UK. It first considers the use of these outcomes as weights for various 
types of education in deriving an aggregate measure. It then examines methods that might 
be used to incorporate changes in the effectiveness of education across time. Finally this 
section presents measures of UK labour input and labour productivity that suggest growth  4
rates close to those achieved in the economy as a whole. Section six presents the outcome, 
input and labour productivity results for the US and then compares results in the two 
countries. This shows the UK outperforming the US in all years. In contrast, relative labour 
productivity growth in the total economy shows the US outperforming the UK in most 
years of the time period considered here. Finally section seven concludes with an outline of 
extensions of the education application in future research.     
2  Outputs, outcomes and productivity: Measurement issues. 
This section sets out definitions and methods to measure output and inputs in public 
services. To start assume at time t a particular sector J provides n services, Y
J
i,  using k 
inputs, X
J
i. Examples of the former are education at various levels (primary, secondary, 
university etc.) or types of medical interventions and of the latter are teaching staff 
(primary and secondary teachers, teaching assistants and university lecturers) and school 
buildings or medical staff (doctors, nurses etc.) and medical equipment.  Let Qi denote the 
quantity of services produced, e.g. number of pupil hours by type or number of operations.  
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Where the operator D(t) denotes the log rate of change, D(t)Y = ln(Yt) – ln(Yt-1) and w 
are weights on the i types of services provided. Similarly productivity growth in sector J 
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Where s are the weights on the k inputs. In what follows we first concentrate on measuring 
service provision (1) and then go on to discuss additional issues relating to the 
measurement of input growth. 
In measuring output growth in private market services the weights w in equation (1) 
are estimated by the share of each individual service in the total value of output produced, 
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If (3) is averaged across time periods t and t-1, and substituted into (1) then we have 
the commonly employed Tornqvist index of output growth. In addition changes in the 
quality of services across time can be incorporated by replacing Q in (3) by volume 
measures in effectiveness units. In practice this is achieved by estimating Q using deflated 
values, with quality adjusted prices replacing actual market prices in the deflation.  
If a service is provided by the public sector, however, market prices do not exist and 
therefore we lack a measure of the marginal benefit to consumers of the service provided. 
In the past measures have been employed whereby the cost of producing service i is used 
as a weight. Suppose each service uses only one input unique to that service, with unit 
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Extending (4) to multiple inputs for each output is straightforward, with the total cost 
terms replaced by a sum across inputs used. Weights such as (4) have been used, for  6
example, in the cost weighted activity index (CWAI) measure of the output of the UK 
health sector calculated by the Department of Health. An alternative approach to cost 
weights is to place value judgements on the relative merits of different types of services. 
However these ‘judgmental’ weights are likely to be controversial at best and open to 
abuse at worst.  
The main problem with using cost shares in publicly provided services is that there is 
no market mechanism that ensures that the marginal cost of providing the service equals 
the marginal benefit to consumers and this may result in significant divergence between 
the two. For example a medical intervention may be very expensive but yield little by way 
of increases in life expectancy or quality of life. Cost weighting gives such treatments an 
unjustifiably high weight. In addition it is difficult to incorporate quality adjustments in the 
cost share approach, i.e. there is no natural equivalent to deflating by quality adjusted 
prices. There is no doubt that quality aspects are important in public service provision, 
most notably in medical care since improvements in medical procedures are substantial and 
so it is important to include quality adjustments. Technological innovation may lower the 
cost of providing a particular service while at the same time rendering it more effective. 
The use of cost share weights would then lead to a lowering of the impact of this service on 
aggregate growth but in reality it should have a greater weight. Innovations that allow for 
out-patient treatments for particular ailments at considerably lower costs have been quite 
common in health provision and often these are more effective than the hospital treatments 
they replaced (e.g. the example of treatment of depression or cataracts- see discussions in 
papers  in Cutler and Berndt, 2001). These observations underly the recent disquiet with 
the CWAI measure for health.  
However these problems extend beyond the lack of markets since much of the 
literature suggests that, even when services are privately provided, the market price may  7
not reflect the ‘true’ benefit to consumers if there are information asymmetries between 
providers and consumers. In health care the consumer has an inadequate basis for making a 
judgement on whether medical interventions are worthwhile, i.e. for making informed 
choices among both providers and types of interventions. In addition there is an argument 
that health care insurance places a wedge between the producer and consumer with 
consequent moral hazard problems. Triplett (2001) argues that the most important 
difference between services such as health care and general market services such as car 
repair is that in the latter case the consumer can sell or scrap the car but this is not possible 
for the consumer of health services (human repair). We have social norms that prevent 
consumers making this decision. Thus even in private health services, information 
provided by the market is inadequate to allow consumers to judge the quality of the service 
they are consuming.   
The lack of market prices and arguments on information asymmetries suggest that it 
may be more useful to measure performance using outcomes rather than outputs. Letting 
Oi denote the outcome from the provision of service i, the simplest measure is merely to 
sum across outputs, assuming they are measured in consistent units as discussed further 
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The first problem with implementing (5) is that outcomes are a function of many 
factors other than the direct provision of a service. For example in health care we can write 
Health outcomes (HO) as follows: 
 
HO  =   H (medical interventions, diet, lifestyle, environment, genetic factors, etc.) 
  8
Since medical interventions are one of a number of contributing inputs to the 
production of health, it is natural to measure the contribution of medical intervention by its 
incremental contribution. Similarly education outcomes depend on a range of background 
variables including the social and ethnic mix of the population as well as the inherent 
ability of the students being educated. 
In general terms we can write service i outcomes in the form: 
) , ( J
i Z J
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where Z are extraneous or background influences. The incremental contribution of the 
service provided to outcomes is then given by the partial derivative with respect to Q in 
equation (6): 
 
Incremental contribution = δ (O )/ δ (Q) 
     other  influences  constant. 
 
There are a number of methods that could be used to measure the incremental 
contributions. At a detailed level we could focus on particular types of services, controlling 
for population differences. Thus the disease based approach in the OECD project on Age 
Related Diseases (ARD) is an example whereby researchers consider detailed medical 
records for a subset of the population (the elderly) – see also papers in Cutler and Berndt, 
2001. Ultimately such a detailed approach is likely to provide the most robust findings but 
is very intensive in research time. Alternatively we can use a regression based approach by 
regressing outcomes such as earnings or life expectancy on the service provided and a 
range of control variables. Regression methods are employed in the education example in  9
section 3 of this paper. Thus in principle we can estimate a measure O*, adjusting for the 
influence of extraneous factors, and substitute this into equation (5). 
In practice, however, it may not be possible to adjust for all background influences in 
a single step, in particular if the factors that affect outcome levels are very different from 
those that affect growth rates and information on both come from different data sources. In 
this case an alternative way of proceeding is to use a two step ‘outcome flow’ method 
whereby information on outcomes are first used to calculate the weights in equation (1) 
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where O* are outcome values having adjusted for the influence of background variables. 








t Q t D t wo YO t D , ) ( ) ( ) (    (8) 
Although useful as a devise to weight the quantity of services, equation (8) does not 
allow outcomes to change over time at a differential rate to changes in quantities, i.e. it 
does not take account of changes in effectiveness through time. Therefore it may be 
necessary to adjust equation (8) by adding a term involving some additional growth in 
outcomes. Letting Q* denote outputs measured in effectiveness units, then ideally we wish 
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The application to education discusses a number of methods of incorporating 
adjustments for increases in effectiveness, one based on an age cohort analysis and a 
second based on an adjustment for the impact of education on long term economic growth. 
Nevertheless this step remains the most difficult to incorporate in practice.  
In order to implement (8), (9) (and in practice equation (5)) all outcomes need to be 
translated into some common metric. Otherwise we would have to include additional 
weights in defining O* in equation (7) and hence would be essentially back to where we 
started with equation (1). One approach would be to translate all outcomes into monetary 
values, adjusting for general inflation, and this we see as probably the best way forward. 
Thus in education the outcome would be lifetime earnings arising from participation in 
education and in health this would be the values of additional years of life through medical 
interventions. Note that the absolute monetary value placed on the outcomes does not 
feature in equation (7) since the weights are outcome shares. Rather what matters is the 
relative impact on outcomes of the services provided.  
The next section sets out an application of the ‘outcome flow’ approach to education. 
Before doing so however we need to consider the input side of the productivity equation 
(2). Here there is much less difficulty since providers of public services must bid for inputs 
in the same market as private firms. Hence the wages paid to inputs can be used to derive 
cost share weights so that aggregate input is derived as a Tornqvist index of individual 
inputs.  In the remainder of this paper we only consider labour input and labour 
productivity measures. Future extensions will also incorporate capital inputs.    
3  Education outputs and outcomes 
The remainder of this paper considers the practical application of the outcome approach to 
international comparisons for the education sector. This is confined to a comparison  11
between the UK and the US. This service was chosen since, at the outset, it appeared that 
the measurement issues were more transparent than in more complex areas such as health 
or social services. The primary quantity of output measure, numbers of pupils educated, is 
relatively easy to measure with plentiful data available to compare across countries. An 
obvious candidate as an outcome measure is test score results but its use leads to some 
difficulties, as discussed further below. There is also a clearly defined outcome measure, 
taking the lead from Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1991), i.e. the impact on lifetime earnings 
arising from education. In measuring the latter it is possible to draw on a vast academic 
literature to set out the estimation issues and survey data can be employed to estimate 
returns to education at each level. Nevertheless a large number of measurement problems 
arise even in this relatively simple application. The purpose of this section is to set out 
clearly the issues involved.  
3.1  Output and Outcome Measurement.  
In this analysis we will consider three measures of the output of the education sector, a 
volume measure, and two ‘quality adjusted’ outcome measures based on test scores and 
earnings, respectively.  The starting point for each measure is a Tornqvist chain linked 
index, of the form of equation (1), based on the growth in pupils/students in each 
educational level between time periods t and t-1, given by:  
∑ ∆ = ∆
i
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where PUP is the number of pupils in education, i is the level of education, ω is a 
weighting factor and ∆ is the first difference operator. By setting a base year equal to 100, 
the growth rates in (10) can be used to construct an index of the output of the education  12
sector. This general framework allows us to measure the annual flow of services of the 
education sector.  
In this section we first consider the three measures using UK data. Following this we 
present estimates for the US and then compare the results for the two countries.  
3.1.1  Volume of output  
The simplest volume measure is to set ω equal to the shares of type i pupils in total pupils. 
An alternative frequently employed volume measure is to weight each type in total 
pupil/student numbers by the share of total expenditure on level i education. But as argued 
in section 2, this approach is best avoided.  Pupil shares ensures that the output measures 
are independent of input changes which is an important consideration when we consider 
productivity growth.  
In this preliminary analysis we confine attention to the period 1994 to 2001 when 
data exist for all measures. The quantity of output measure employed at ONS is changes in 
pupil hours. They have in fact assumed that the hours each pupil is taught per annum is 
fixed so 'pupil hours' is actually measured as the total number of pupils being taught (full-
time equivalent). This gives an indication of the change in the volume of education output. 
Following ONS we divide the UK education system into seven levels, nursery, primary, 
secondary, further education (below degree level), undergraduate, postgraduate and special 
schools. 
Table 1 shows index numbers from 1994 to 2001 for these categories for the UK. 
The final two rows show shares of pupil numbers in the base year 1995 and annual average 
growth rates across the period. In total pupil/student numbers increased by 2.4 per cent per 
annum with the largest increases in the two higher education categories. Higher education 
represented about 11% of pupil/student numbers in 1995 – by 2001 this had risen to 13%.  13
Large increases were also found in nursery, which however represented only a small 
proportion of the total. Over this period pupils aged 16 plus grew faster than those up to 
age 15 in secondary schools. Further education also shows above average increases. 
 
Table 1 Pupil/Student Numbers, UK, 1994-2001 
 Secondary  Higher  Education 
 
Nursery  Primary 
up to age 15 age 16+
Further 
Education Undergrad Postgrad  Special Total 
1994  99.0  98.7 97.8 99.2  93.6 93.8  92.0  98.9  96.8 
1995  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1996  99.4  101.6 98.7 105.8  97.6 102.9  99.8  98.9  100.3
1997  98.9  102.4 99.7 112.7  93.3 106.4  99.3  99.0  100.5
1998  99.2  102.9 100.1 114.3 92.0  118.0  119.4  99.2  102.0
1999  98.2  102.7 102.1 114.2 91.3  115.8  111.8  98.5  101.9
2000  121.1  102.0 102.3 114.5  109.0 117.5  115.8  97.6  105.8
2001  142.8  101.3 103.9 115.5  114.5 123.4  129.1  96.6  107.9
SH95 0.48  38.76  23.76  3.88  21.33  9.03  1.88  0.88 100.00
G 5.22  0.37 0.85 2.17  2.88 3.92  4.84  -0.34  1.55 
SH95 = share in total pupils 1995, G = annual average growth rate, 1994-2001 
 
 
Thus the greatest percent increases have been achieved at the ‘higher quality’ end of 
the distribution. A straightforward pupil weighted index does not capture this quality 
differential. 
3.1.2  Quality adjusted output: test score outcomes. 
An obvious candidate to construct a quality adjusted output measure is to incorporate the 
results from test scores into the analysis. Table 2 shows a range of test score measures at 
different education levels which in theory could be applied to the volume measures in 
Table 1. All measures show large increases over the period with those in primary and 
GCSEs dominating. 
  14




Level 4 or 
greater 
GCSE: 









Per cent of pupils/students   
1994 62.5  46.6  66.1  47.2 
1995 62.5  47.8  68.9  47.5 
1996 62.5  48.4  70.0  47.8 
1997 62.5  49.3  69.0  48.2 
1998 62.0  50.9  69.4  49.7 
1999 70.0  53.1  70.0  50.2 
2000 73.5  54.7  86.2  51.1 
2001 73.0  55.7  74.2  52.9 
Index 1995=1.00 
1994 1.00  0.98  0.96  0.99 
1995 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1996 1.00  1.01  1.02  1.01 
1997 1.00  1.03  1.00  1.01 
1998 0.99  1.07  1.01  1.05 
1999 1.12  1.11  1.02  1.06 
2000 1.18  1.14  1.06  1.08 
2001 1.17  1.17  1.08  1.11 
Notes:  
1. Average English and Maths. Note primary test scores not available before 
1997 so these were assumed constant up to then;  
2. As % attempting A-levels. 
 
In principle it should be possible to utilise the information in Table 2  with the volume 
measures in Table 1 to arrive at a quality adjusted measure. in order to do so we need to 
impute a weight to pupils/students who achieve the threshold level relative to those who do 
not reach this level (with the latter normalised to equal one). Thus for each education level 
i, we compute a pupil effectiveness index 
PUPEi = αi PUPi λi + (1- αi ) PUPi       ( 11) 
Where  αi is the percent of level i pupils achieving the threshold score and λi is the 
effectiveness ratio. Summing across the i levels gives a ‘quality adjusted’ alternative to 
equation (10):  15
∑ ∆ = ∆
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where ω
e is the share of type i effective pupils in PUPE (averaged across period t and t-1 as 
in (1)).  
The problem in using test scores is that there is no basis on which to impute the 
effectiveness ratios, λi . In addition it is necessary to impute a value to education levels not 
covered by test score statistics. The most reasonable assumption is to use the closest 
equivalent category for omitted ones (primary scores for nursery and special schools and 
A-levels for further education).  Assuming λ is the same across education levels, 
calculations based on (3) are shown in  Figure 1 for three variants together with the volume 
measure for comparison purposes. These assume pupils/students achieving the threshold 
values are 10%, 25% and 50%, respectively, ‘more effective’ than pupils who do not reach 
this level. This shows that the results are sensitive to the weights employed but all three 
show faster growth than a crude volume measure, varying from higher growth of about 
0.1% p.a. to 0.5% p.a. depending on the weights used.  
In reality we would expect the effectiveness measures, λ, to vary by type of 
education received but by how much is difficult to gauge. One possibility would be to use   
information on relative earnings. However detailed estimates of the impact on earnings of 
an additional GCSE or A-level or comparisons of graduate earnings by grade of degree 

























There are a number of additional problems in attempting a calculation of this kind. First the 
results are sensitive to the cut-off point in each indicator. For example using percent of 
pupils aged 15 with 1 or more GCSE and the lowest 10% ‘effectiveness’ weight would 
lower the overall growth by about 0.4% per annum since this indicator grows much less 
rapidly than the indicator in Table 2. Further problems arise when there is a suspicion of 
‘grade inflation’ so that increases in the scores may not reflect any true improvement. This 
is a concern with both secondary and higher education levels. Again this could be dealt 
with if there were detailed data on earnings – if improved scores are primarily due to grade 
inflation then the market will not remunerate workers with improved scores. Against this it 
may be the case that some tests are set up so that there is a general tendency for 
diminishing returns to set in at some stage. Thus in primary education the tests are set up 
so that pupils are required to pass some (time invariant) threshold. Increasing effort may be 
required to get pupils at the lowest end of the ability to pass this threshold. Finally 
achieving test score results may be subject to extraneous influences outside the education  17
sector, such as effort put in by parents. This is less important when considering changes 
over time than when comparing across pupils or schools at a point in time, but nonetheless 
remains a concern.   
4  Earnings outcomes. 
An alternative to the use of test scores is to use information from earnings in the 
marketplace to weight achievements at each education level. This section first considers 
the estimation of wage premiums to education, controlling for other influences on earnings. 
We then use this information to derive an earnings outcome based approach to measure 
education provision.  
4.1  Estimating education wage premiums and lifetime earnings 
In this study we will concentrate on the private financial return to education as a measure 
of education outcomes. Whilst we do not downplay the importance of the social return to 
education investment, such research is not possible within the confines of this particular 
project. The effect of education on labour market outcomes has a number of dimensions. 
Most important of these is the wage an individual can expect to earn with a given level of 
education. Another factor, which has an indirect impact on earnings, is the probability that 
an individual will be able to find a job in the first place. There are essentially three 
potential labour market states an individual can find themselves in their lifetime: (i) in 
work; (ii) unemployed; and (iii) economically-inactive. Difficulties arise in valuing the 
non-pecuniary aspects of each of these states (non-wage benefits of working; the value of 
spare time when unemployed or inactive). Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1991) take one 
extreme view of this when they attempt to calculate the value of each hour spent in work 
and leisure. They argue that individuals are free to choose their hours and will do so such 
that the marginal value of work and leisure are equal. The implication of this for working  18
individuals is that each hour of leisure (except that spent sleeping) is worth the same in 
dollar terms as those in work. This has a number of difficulties for working people. It 
assumes that workers are indeed free to choose the hours they work, or at least able to 
make a trade off between working hours and wages. A difficult assumption to sustain is 
that the higher paid have a better quality of non-working life than the less well paid. 
The first step is to estimate the impact of education on earnings controlling for 
extraneous influences. In our analysis of the outcome on earnings we will employ a 
standard Mincerian human capital earning function
1. In the standard model estimates the 
log of earnings as a function of years of schooling and a second or more-order polynomial 
of experience. For example: 
() i
k
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where  
Y = income,  
s = years of schooling,  
e = experience (years in employment),  
C = a vector of control variables 
ε = is an error term ε ~ N(0,σ). 
 
There are a number of issues relating to the estimation of such equations. The first is 
the question of whether years of schooling represent the correct measure of schooling. This 
may be valid in countries like the US, Card (1999) argues, but less so in countries like 
Germany and France, which have multiple education streams. For our purpose, it is 
important to link expenditure, via outputs to outcomes. The public sector in general 
allocates funds not to an extra year of education, but rather to particular types of education:  19
i.e. to specific levels (e.g. primary), for particular qualifications (e.g. the new AS level), or 
a particular initiative (e.g. targeting mathematical skills). Therefore, for this study it is 
more appropriate to replace the s term in (13) with terms for the particular level of 
education experienced and/or qualification obtained. That is 
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where q represent l levels of education. 
 
In the UK the breakdown is as follows: 
  Qualification level  Variable name 
1. No  qualifications  NOQUAL 
2.  Secondary education up to GCSE  GCSE 
3.  Secondary education up to A-Level  ALEVEL 
4. Trade  Apprenticeships  TRADAPP 
5. Further  Education  qualification  FE 
6.  Higher education – Undergraduate  HE_UG 
7.  Higher education – Postgraduate  HE_PG 
 
The baseline category in the regressions is no qualifications. For completeness trade 
apprenticeships are included as a separate category although these do not feature in our 
education outputs. 
 
In the US it is: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1 The study of the private returns to education has a long history. David Card provides a useful survey of the  20
  Qualification level  Variable name 
1.  Less than 11
th Grade  - 
2. 11
th Grade  GRADE11 
3. 12
th Grade, but no Diploma  GRADE12N 
4. 12
th Grade, High School Diploma, GED   GRADE12D 
5.  Some college but no degree  SOMECOL 
6. Associate  degree  ASSDEG 
7. Undergraduate  degree  UG 
8.  Postgraduate of professional degree  PG 
 
The baseline category in the regressions is education to less than 11th Grade. 
 
One important issue to bear in mind when considering the effect of education on 
earnings is the fact that we only observe wages for those individuals who are in work. We 
may not observe the wages of others for two main reasons. The first is that individuals 
cannot find wage at a level that is high enough to entice them into work. Because of this, 
we will not observe the lower end of the wage distribution and so estimates of the effect of 
education on income will be biased upwards. If wages are increasing in education, this bias 
will be worse at lower levels of education, since fewer individuals with lower levels of 
education will be offered a wage. This will, at least in part, be offset if better educated 
individuals have higher reservation wages. Tied up with this is the fact that some 
individuals may leave the labour market for other reasons, such as childbearing. The 
second reason why we do not observe an individual’s wage is because there is no work 
available at any wage. That is, the individual is unemployed. 
Because of the potential for our estimates to be biased, we employ a ‘Heckman 
correction/selection’ methodology in estimating wages (Heckman, 1976). In this model 
equation (14) is modified to account for the fact that the dependent variable in the earnings 
                                                                                                                                                                                
causal effect of education on earnings in his Handbook of Labor Economics chapter (Card, 1999).  21
regression is only observed if a secondary inequality is satisfied (the ‘selection equation’). 
That is, the dependent variable in equation (14) for individual i is only observed if 
0 > + i i z υ γ       ( 1 5 )  
 
where the error term υ ~ N(0,1) and corr(ε, υ) = ρ. 
When ρ ≠ 0, a standard regression of equation (14) will yield biased results. The 
Heckman selection model provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for all the 
parameters in such models. In the results we report the Wald test of independence of the 
selection and earnings equations, i.e. the likelihood ratio test that ρ = 0. In addition to 
reporting ρ, we also report the selectivity effect, λ = ρσ, as well as its standard error. 
Before we continue, we must note that there are two additional potential biases in 
OLS estimates of the returns to education. The first is due to an omitted variable measuring 
the innate ability of an individual, the second is that family background may also affect an 
individual’s educational attainment. There is a long history of using instrumental variables 
(see Card, 1999, for a survey). These instrumental variables analyses tend to find higher 
returns to education. However, Dearden suggests that conventional OLS estimates of the 
returns to education can generally be relied upon for policy decisions after estimating 
models which take account of individual ability and parental influence on education. 
Therefore, in order to keep this work as transparent as possible we do not follow an 
instrumental variables approach. 
4.2  The Influence of Education on Economic Activity 
Another way in which education has an impact on the labour market experience of 
individuals is via its affect on economic activity. Not only are those with higher levels of 
education likely to attract higher wages, they are also less likely to be unemployed and  22
may also be less likely to be economically inactive (Stevens, 2003). Therefore, when 
attempting to measure the influence of education on lifetime earnings, it is also important 
to assess the impact on economic activity. Therefore we estimate a multinomial-logistic 
model of the probability of an individual being in one of three labour market states 
(employed, unemployed, inactive). 
The probability that person i finds themselves in any one of these mutually exclusive 


















      ( 1 6 )  
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, j 
= 0, …, 3 are the potential outcomes (0 = employment, 1 = unemployment, 2 = 
economically inactive). In order to remove the indeterminacy of the model, we normalise 
by setting β0 = 0. That is, the probabilities we calculate are the probability of the particular 
outcome relative to being employed. The probabilities of each outcome are, therefore, 
()









































     ( 1 7 )  
4.3  The Total Effect of Education on Lifetime Earnings 
The total effect of education on lifetime earnings is the product of the wages an individual 
might expect to earn if working and the probability of not working. Not earning a wage 
influences our estimation of lifetime earnings in two ways. First, as we have seen, it may  23
bias our estimates of the determinants of earnings if there are any systematic differences 
between individuals for whom we have earnings data and those for whom we do not. 
Second, people without work will earn nothing, or at least have a much lower level of 
income, such as unemployment benefit or insurance. In what follows, we assume that 
unemployed people in the UK earn the basic rate of unemployment benefit, and those in 
the US earn unemployment insurance equal to half of their earnings (implicitly this 
involves two simplifying assumptions: that they are not unemployed for periods longer 
than 26 weeks in a ‘benefit year’ and that they do not usually earn more than the 
threshold). Therefore, the total effect of education on earnings is 
( ) () () ( ) [ ] emp P unemp P unemp UP emp P W E q q q q q q − − × + + = 1 0    (18) 
where Eq = the total earnings associated with education level q, Wq is the predicted effect 
on wages from the earnings regression, Pq(emp) is the probability of being employed from 
the activity regression, U is the income the individual would obtain if they were 
unemployed, Pq is the probability of being unemployed from the activity regression. Thus 
equation (6) says that expected earnings are the sum of the chances of being employed 
multiplied by the wages that would be earned, the unemployment benefit multiplied by the 
chances of being unemployed plus the chances of being inactive multiplied by zero (i.e. we 
assume that individuals gain nothing financially from economic activity). 
4.3.1  Results for the UK 
The results for the UK are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. These are based on data from 
Summer 1996 to Spring 1997. Table 4 presents the results of the earnings estimation. The 
Wald test of independence is significantly different from zero (χ
2 = 1860.77), clearly 
justifying the Heckman selection model.  24
Earnings are increasing in experience and educational qualifications for both men 
and women, although the effect of experience is decreasing because of the non-linearity in 
the specification. We can see the importance of examining the effects of qualifications on 
wages rather than simply years of education by the fact than the returns to A-Levels and 
FE are very different. Although, the coefficients on both in our earnings equation are 
statistically different from that of on the GCSE variable, that for FE is much lower than 
that for A-Levels. Those with trade apprenticeships as their highest qualification typically 
earn less than those with FE qualifications. However, there has been a considerable decline 
in the numbers undertaking trade apprenticeships and so reflects these structural changes in 
the labour market.  
One explanation for the difference between the returns to further education and those 
to A-Levels is an unobserved ability bias. It is likely that those students who enter further 
education are have lower levels of innate ability, and certainly lower GCSE scores, than 
those who take A-Levels. In order for these estimates of returns to truly represent 
additional earnings power engendered by further and sixth-form education we would need 
more detailed information on GCSEs or some measure of innate ability
2. 
Turning to the activity equations in Table 5 we see a similar pattern emerge. The 
probability of unemployment is declining in qualification level. Again further education 
has a smaller effect in reducing the likelihood of unemployment than A-Levels. 
The results are similar for inactivity, with the probability of an individual being 
economically inactive declining with education. Unlike the results for unemployment, 
those who undertake further education are less likely than those with A-Levels to be 
economically inactive. 
                                                           
2 Although Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) argue that measures of cognitive ability and schooling are 
so highly correlated as to make separating their effects impossible.  25
We can compare our results to other work by converting our coefficients into a ‘per 
year’ equivalent, to give an estimate of the rate of return. We do this by subtracting from 
the coefficient for a particular level that for the previous level and dividing this by the 
years of additional schooling required for the extra qualification. For example, if we wish 
to consider the rate of return for a year of undergraduate study for men, we first subtract 
the coefficient for the return to an A-Level education from that for undergraduate studies to 
obtain the additional earnings due to undergraduate studies (0.49970 - 0.30196 = 0.19774). 
We then divide this number by the number of years it takes to complete undergraduate 
education (typically three) to get a rate of return for undergraduate studies of 0.065913, or 
6.6%. This compares to the estimated average return to a year of schooling of 6.5% in the 
OLS results of Chevalier and Walker (2001) for the UK in 1995 (using the Family 
Expenditure Survey). Chevalier and Walker (2001) also undertake a similar estimation of 
the returns to qualifications using the British Household Panel Survey (although their 
breakdown of qualifications is different). The results for postgraduate and undergraduate 
degrees and A-Levels are of a similar order to ours, although their returns to GCSEs are 
much higher. This may be due to differences in specification, since their variables have 
different qualifications subsumed in them; they also include a number of vocational 








Table 3 Implied Rates of Return, UK 
  Coefficient  Years of schooling   Rate of Return 
Men 
Secondary education up to GCSE  0.03033  Same as for no 
qualifications  - 
Secondary education up to A-Level  0.30196  GCSE+2  0.135815 
Further Education qualification  0.19363  GCSE +2  0.08165 
Higher education – Undergraduate  0.49970  A-level +3  0.065913 
Higher education – Postgraduate  0.58566  HE UG +3  0.028653 
Women 
Secondary education up to GCSE  0.00122  Same as for no 
qualifications  - 
Secondary education up to A-Level  0.28150  GCSE+2  0.14014 
Further Education qualification  0.11219  GCSE +2  0.055485 
Higher education – Undergraduate  0.53961  A-level +3  0.086037 
Higher education – Postgraduate  0.65474  HE UG +3  0.038377 
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Table 4 Earnings Equations, UK 
Using Heckman Selection Method 
Men Women 








0.12380***  0.08376***   potexp 
(0.00297)  (0.00347)  
-0.00469***  -0.00435***   potexp
2 
(0.00017)  (0.00020)  
0.00006***  0.00007***   potexp
3 
(0.00000)  (0.00000)  
0.06135*** -0.35686*** 0.21715*** -0.40223***  Health 
problem  (0.01238) (0.01644) (0.01543) (0.01546) 
-0.01065 -0.31829*** 0.33829*** -0.39813***  Black 
(0.03971) (0.05313) (0.04689) (0.04726) 
0.12089*** -0.40033*** 0.34497*** -0.42583***  Indian 
(0.03839) (0.05111) (0.05016) (0.04958) 
-0.10126** -0.49762*** 0.70475*** -1.05527***  Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi  (0.04839) (0.06044) (0.08179) (0.07104) 
0.17452*** -0.62626*** 0.49163*** -0.45197***  Other Asian 
(0.06432) (0.08152) (0.07419) (0.07333) 
-0.06557 -0.06923  0.20330** -0.09121  Mixed 
(0.07070) (0.09805) (0.08235) (0.08535) 
0.11090 -0.59353*** 0.49335*** -0.64536***  Other 
(0.11057) (0.13969) (0.13752) (0.13103) 
0.58566*** 0.64915*** 0.65474*** 0.61533*** 
HE_PG  (0.02576) (0.03817) (0.03613) (0.04014) 
0.49970*** 0.47880*** 0.53961*** 0.51814*** 
HE_UG  (0.01857) (0.02517) (0.02215) (0.02256) 
0.19363*** 0.47966*** 0.11219*** 0.55726*** 
FE  (0.01732) (0.02296) (0.02033) (0.02035) 
0.15119*** 0.24832*** 0.09098*** 0.20078*** 
TRADEAPP  (0.01811) (0.02413) (0.03373) (0.03418) 
0.30196*** 0.35128*** 0.28150*** 0.35377***  ALEVEL  (0.02128) (0.02874) (0.02542) (0.02569) 
0.03033* 0.38578*** 0.00122 0.40445***  GCSE  (0.01639) (0.02139) (0.01771) (0.01750) 
0.88053*** -1.44071*** 1.43092*** -1.33373*** 
DKQUAL  (0.05221) (0.05017) (0.07035) (0.05633) 
 0.18443***   0.02323  age 
 (0.01546)  (0.01423) 
 -0.00446***   0.00057  age
2 
 (0.00044)  (0.00040) 
 0.00003***  -0.00001***  age
3 
 (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 0.22894***  -0.09507***  married 
 (0.01246)  (0.00963) 
8.67921*** -2.45660*** 8.77172*** -0.93397***  Constant 
(0.02130) (0.17126) (0.02444) (0.15839) 
ρ  -0.87  -0.95  
σ  0.73  0.99  
λ  -0.64 (0.01) -0.94 (0.01) 
χ
2  1860.77  2625.72  
p(χ
2)  0.00  0.00  
Observations  40829  42856  
censored  18928  20336  
• Standard errors in parentheses     
• * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
• χ
2 = Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0  28
Table 5 Activity equations, UK 
Multinomial logit (omitted category = in employment) 
  Men Women 
  Unemp Inactivity Unemp Inactivity 
-0.11392** -0.74551*** -0.13372** 0.23104***  age 
(0.05210) (0.04062) (0.06331) (0.02956) 
0.00127 0.01631*** 0.00272  -0.00903***  age
2 
(0.00152) (0.00116) (0.00188) (0.00084) 
0.00000 -0.00011*** -0.00002 0.00010***  age
3 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) 
-1.05186*** -0.81887*** -0.77075*** 0.02776  Married 
(0.05588) (0.04477) (0.06228) (0.02807) 
0.67049*** 2.14487*** 0.49158*** 1.15115***  Health 
problem  (0.05517) (0.03840) (0.06607) (0.02799) 
1.11179*** 0.71900*** 1.11639*** 0.54280***  Black 
(0.12473) (0.13287) (0.12950) (0.08945) 
0.52697*** 0.55681*** 0.84025*** 0.53165***  Indian 
(0.16022) (0.12958) (0.16263) (0.08887) 
1.17498*** 1.09317*** 1.53778*** 2.05590***  Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi  (0.14347) (0.12757) (0.20964) (0.11729) 
0.90149*** 1.92392*** 0.80831*** 0.90871***  Other Asian 
(0.23537) (0.15730) (0.26670) (0.13029) 
0.63706** 0.40058* 0.66451** 0.42649***  Mixed 
(0.25837) (0.23626) (0.26591) (0.16063) 
1.37044*** 1.28737*** 0.96922** 1.16348***  Other 
(0.34391) (0.31919) (0.43963) (0.21604) 
-1.72277*** -1.64641*** -1.41683*** -2.19488*** 
HE_PG  (0.18140) (0.14678) (0.21590) (0.11279) 
-1.29574*** -1.18331*** -1.05639*** -1.70076*** 
HE_UG  (0.08898) (0.07266) (0.10366) (0.04953) 
-0.96322*** -1.25020*** -0.73128*** -1.40473*** 
FE  (0.06915) (0.05988) (0.08309) (0.04008) 
-0.97049*** -0.94141*** -1.17464*** -0.74257*** 
TRADEAPP  (0.08165) (0.06165) (0.20365) (0.06361) 
-1.29766*** -0.19482*** -0.89905*** -0.87753***  ALEVEL  (0.10228) (0.06483) (0.11117) (0.04816) 
-0.90798*** -0.88895*** -0.57008*** -0.93709***  GCSE  (0.06190) (0.04921) (0.06994) (0.03163) 
-0.69264*** -0.31490* -0.81897** -0.59708*** 
DKQUAL  (0.23880) (0.18481) (0.37018) (0.14245) 
0.70785 8.38751*** 0.19053  -1.66531***  Constant 
(0.55139) (0.43102) (0.65683) (0.32376) 
Observations 39176  39176  41781  41781 
•  Standard errors in parentheses      
•  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
 
 
In order to test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of year, we also performed 
the same analysis on data from the summer 1998 to spring 1999 quarters. The results of 
these analyses are presented in the Appendix as Table 12 and Table 13. We can see that the 
results are fairly similar, with returns to university education being slightly higher and  29
those to FE slightly lower. The figures for the returns to A-levels and GCSEs are 
approximately equal.  
 
4.4  Results for the US 
The results for the US are presented in Table 7 and Table 8. Again, the Wald test of 
independence is significantly different from zero (χ
2 = 1860.77), justifying our use of the 
Heckman selection model. Earnings in the US are also increasing in education and 
experience as we would expect a priori. The rate of return to the 11
th and 12
th grades 
(without achieving a diploma) are similar, at around 8.5%. Achieving a diploma has a 
strong positive effect on earnings, although it is unlikely that the comparison with those 
who achieve only 10
th or 11
th grade is appropriate here, since it is likely that most if not all 
of those who could achieve a High School Diploma continue until 12
th grade and so those 
who drop out before 12
th grade are come from a similar population to those who stay to 
12
th grade and do not obtain a Diploma. Likewise, the return to those attending college and 
obtaining an associate degree is just under 8%, whereas for those who do not obtain a 
degree it is actually negative, i.e. they have similar earnings to those who are only educated 
to 11
th grade. The returns to an undergraduate degree are much higher than those to 
associate degrees and there is little return to postgraduate degrees over and above 
undergraduate study. To put these figures in perspective, Trostel, Walker and Wooley 
(2002) estimate the returns to a year of schooling in the US to be 12.99% and 14.66%, for 




Table 6 Implied Rates of Return, US 




Men      
11th Grade  0.0852  <11th grade + 1  0.0852 
12th Grade, but no Diploma  0.1693  11th grade + 1  0.0841 
12th Grade, High School Diploma, GED   0.38718  11th grade + 1  0.30198
Some college but no degree  0.06029  12th grade + 1  -0.3269 
Associate degree  0.5405  12th grade + 2  0.07666
Undergraduate degree  0.94224  Ass deg + 3  0.13391
Postgraduate of professional degree  0.9097  UG + 3  -0.0108 
Women      
11th Grade  0.0852  <11th grade + 1  -0.8245 
12th Grade, but no Diploma  0.1693  11th grade + 1  0.0841 
12th Grade, High School Diploma, GED   0.38718  11th grade + 1  0.30198
Some college but no degree  0.06029  12th grade + 1  -0.3269 
Associate degree  0.5405  12th grade + 2  0.07666
Undergraduate degree  0.94244  Ass deg + 3  0.13398
Postgraduate of professional degree  0.9097  UG + 3  -0.0109 
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Table 7 Earnings Equations, US 
Using Heckman Selection Method 
  Men Women 








0.07655***   0.06196***   potexp  (0.00148)   (0.00157)  
-0.00242***   -0.00229***   potexp
2 
(0.00009)   (0.00010)  
0.00003***   0.00003***   potexp
3 
(0.00000)   (0.00000)  
-0.12484*** -0.14183*** 0.02503***  -0.08737***  Black 
(0.00888) (0.01374) (0.00915) (0.01185) 
-0.06522*** -0.19949*** 0.03212  -0.15235***  American 
Indian  (0.02273) (0.03413) (0.02607) (0.03208) 
-0.10297*** -0.07081*** 0.08876***  -0.14616***  Asian 
(0.01259) (0.02009) (0.01478) (0.01846) 
0.90970*** 0.32221*** 0.77257*** 0.84310*** 
PG 
(0.01191) (0.01886) (0.01532) (0.01949) 
0.94224*** 0.38101*** 0.73544*** 0.75519*** 
UG 
(0.01010) (0.01623) (0.01286) (0.01559) 
0.54050*** 0.37647*** 0.33964*** 0.78249*** 
ASSDEG 
(0.01218) (0.02006) (0.01451) (0.01804) 
0.06029*** -0.00653 0.02343*** 0.11502*** 
SOMECOL 
(0.00714) (0.01154) (0.00810) (0.01046) 
0.38718*** 0.25422*** 0.18933*** 0.53696*** 
GRADE12D 
(0.00921) (0.01406) (0.01191) (0.01375) 
0.16930*** 0.15881*** 0.03173  0.30448*** 
GRADE12N 
(0.02206) (0.03351) (0.02903) (0.03397) 
0.08520*** 0.08564*** -0.10843*** 0.26627*** 
GRADE11 
(0.01441) (0.02061) (0.01811) (0.02068) 
 0.36288***   0.11707***  age 
 (0.00991)   (0.00900) 
 -0.00911***   -0.00226***  age
2 
 (0.00028)   (0.00025) 
 0.00007***   0.00001***  age
3 
 (0.00000)   (0.00000) 
 0.21723***   -0.16986***  married 
 (0.00798)   (0.00658) 
5.40611*** -4.08790*** 5.49119***  -1.79879***  Constant 
(0.01027) (0.10712) (0.01266) (0.09840) 
ρ  -0.86   -0.92  
σ  0.73   0.87  
λ  -0.63 0.00  -0.79 0.00 
χ
2  4828.49   7166.78  
p(χ
2)  0.00   0.00  
Observations 106448    112926   
censored 31248    40507   
• Standard errors in parentheses     
• * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
• χ
2 = Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0  32
 
Table 8 Activity equations, US 
Multinomial logit (omitted category = in employment) 
Men Women 
 
Unemp  Inactivity Unemp Inactivity 
-0.17391*** -0.65619*** 0.05100  -0.05779***  age 
(0.03915) (0.02457)  (0.04437)  (0.01854) 
0.00295*** 0.01453***  -0.00228* -0.00078  age2 
(0.00113) (0.00070)  (0.00130)  (0.00052) 
-0.00002* -0.00009*** 0.00002*  0.00002***  age3 
(0.00001) (0.00001)  (0.00001)  (0.00000) 
-0.09376*** -1.05966*** -0.28653*** 0.49200***  married 
(0.03586) (0.02503)  (0.03951)  (0.01684) 
0.68408*** 0.73569***  0.75330***  0.21310***  Black 
(0.04267) (0.02888)  (0.04241)  (0.02263) 
0.77667*** 0.71824***  0.72782***  0.35778***  American 
Indian  (0.09888) (0.07134)  (0.11126)  (0.05859) 
0.05922 0.57020***  0.16948*  0.33952***  Asian 
(0.07786) (0.04644)  (0.08884)  (0.03421) 
-0.57442*** -1.67612*** -1.60002*** -2.08839*** 
PG 
(0.07487) (0.05828)  (0.10372)  (0.04113) 
-0.87678*** -1.42183*** -1.48555*** -1.66849*** 
UG 
(0.06326) (0.04261)  (0.07206)  (0.02900) 
-0.68924*** -1.26613*** -1.38702*** -1.71946*** 
ASDACA 
(0.07646) (0.05457)  (0.08547)  (0.03491) 
-0.08716** 0.14388*** -0.36807*** -0.18687*** 
ASDVOC 
(0.04189) (0.02823)  (0.04816)  (0.02000) 
-0.37080*** -0.86302*** -0.78252*** -1.16227*** 
GRADE12D 
(0.04823) (0.03026)  (0.05402)  (0.02412) 
-0.14655 -0.41424*** -0.37980*** -0.54299*** 
GRADE12N 
(0.10639) (0.06849)  (0.12399)  (0.05856) 
-0.12270* -0.27381*** -0.33293*** -0.49700*** 
GRADE11 
(0.06544) (0.03927)  (0.07247)  (0.03531) 
0.65421 7.68793***  -1.92146*** 1.55901***  Constant 
(0.40902) (0.25692)  (0.45956)  (0.20028) 
Observations  106448  106448 112926 112926 
•  Standard errors in parentheses      
•  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
 
 
5  Lifetime earnings and productivity: results for the UK  
5.1  Lifetime earnings as weights: results for the UK 
 The results of the analysis in the previous section gives the lifetime earnings achievable 
for given levels of education and given assumptions on activity rates. The results for the 
UK are summarised in the Table 9  below.  33
Table 9 Discounted Lifetime earnings, UK. 
  Discounted lifetime earnings* 
  Total  Relative to no qualifications 
   
HE_post graduate  £228,736 1.501 
HE_under graduate  £240,710 1.579 
FE £209,248 1.373 
A-level £227,941 1.495 
GCSE £185,587 1.218 
No Qualifications  £152,424 1.000 
* average of male and female earnings 
 
 
We then want to combine this information with the volume measure (number of 
pupils/students) to arrive at an annual outcome flow measure. This is achieved by 
translating the results in Table 9 into an incremental flow of lifetime earnings from each 
year spent in the education system. To do so requires some assumptions regarding the 
lifetime earnings within each education level. The simplest approach is to assume equal 
step increases for each year of schooling within the education level. For example consider 
the case of primary school education which typically lasts 7 years. Pupils who complete 
one year of primary school are deemed to earn one seventh of the primary school addition 
to lifetime earnings, two years earn two sevenths etc. Thus the additional output for pupils 
in their second year is 1/7 *LTE where LTE is (discounted) lifetime earnings from primary 
education. Thus in any one year, if we assume an equal distribution of pupils across the 
seven years, the primary school output is (1/7) LTE times the number of primary school 
pupils. In general for each of i education levels lasting for k years, earnings outcomes in 
each year are given by 
∑ =
i
t i PUP i LTE
k t i EO ,
1
,      ( 1 9 )   34
The share of type i total earnings outcomes in total EO can then be used as weights in 
a Tornqvist index:  
∑ ∆ = ∆
i
t i PUP t i
o
t QO ) , ln( , ω      ( 2 0 )  




























5 . 0 , ω  
The formula in equation (20) is similar to that employed by Jorgenson and Fraumeni 
(1991) in estimating the output of the US education sector. The main difference is that in 
this paper our estimates of lifetime earnings are based on regression analysis whereas 
Jorgenson and Fraumeni use US census data divided by sex, age and educational 
attainment. In addition Jorgenson and Fraumeni allow their lifetime earnings shares to vary 
across time whereas we base our estimates on regressions for a single year. Future 
extensions of this paper will attempt to incorporate time varying shares. 
This formula was applied to the UK education data from 1994 to 2001.
3 Note in 
implementing this approach we need to impute a value for earnings if an individual had no 
education whatsoever. This we base on the minimum wage in both countries. The results 
are shown in Figure 2 together with the crude volume measure and the test score measure 
with effectiveness ratio set to 1.1. The lifetime earnings relative to no qualifications in 
Table 9 suggest weights in this range rather than 1.25 or 1.5. The three measure show 
similar trends in the beginning of the period but diverge towards the end with the earnings 
                                                           
3 A minor complications in applying this to the UK data is that the lifetime earnings estimated above refer to 
completed qualifications so that some pupils may attend education up to some age but not qualify. An 
adjustment was therefore incorporated to impute the GCSE and A-level earnings only to those pupils who 
gained at least one GCSE or A-level. This adjustment was minor as in the current period 98% of pupils who 
attend school up to age 16 or attempt A-levels achieve a pass in at least one subject.  35
outcome measure showing the highest growth.  This outcome measure increases the annual 
average growth rate to 1.77 as against 1.55 using the crude volume measure.   
Thus an outcome measure based on the valuation by the market suggests a small, but 
not insignificant, upward adjustment to the volume measure.  
Note these life-time earnings calculations do not vary with time. If the improvements 
in test scores in Table 2, are real changes in the effectiveness of pupils then wages relative 
to a base category should change across time. One possibility would be to examine age 
cohort effects, for example considering the wages received by individuals aged t in one 
year relative to those aged t+1 in that year.  The next subsection discusses some crude 
estimates based on a cohort analysis. 
 




















5.2  Cohort Analysis Example 
As an example of the methods of implementing such a cohort analysis of education 
outputs, and the problems associated with this, we consider the following example for the 
UK. The data come from the Labour Force Survey 1997-99. Consider two cohorts, one 
leaving school in 1995, and one leaving in 1994. We could compare the affect of their 
GCSE by comparing the wages they earn. Table 10 provides such a comparison. The 
figures for ‘mean wage’ is the mean net weekly wage of full time workers of a particular 
age taken from the summer quarter of the LFS. The summer quarter was chosen because 
all but one twelfth of the age group would have graduated in the same year
4. The ‘raw 
difference’ is the proportional difference between the mean wage of that cohort and that of 









where r18 is the raw difference for the cohort aged 18, w18 is the mean wage for that cohort 
and w17 is that for the cohort aged 17. 
The wage net of experience is the mean wage adjusted for the cohort’s potential 
experience, i.e. their current age minus the age they left school (in this case, by the end of 
the academic year they would be 16), using the estimated coefficients from Table 4. The 
adjusted difference is the proportional difference between the mean adjusted wage of that 
cohort and that of the cohort a year younger. 
We can see from Table 10 that the comparison depends on the date in which one uses 
to calculate the difference. If we had done so in 1996, we would say that those who took a 
GCSE in 1994 earned 21.3% more than those who graduated in 1995. However if we 
compared cohorts using 1997 data, we would say this difference was 15.6%. If we chose  37
1998, the figure would be -0.002%! There are a number of reasons for these disparities. 
First, the cell sizes are particularly small. It may well be that other factors that influence 
wages are not constant across the samples. Second, we may be mistaken to take the 
potential experience effect from an equation estimated on one year’s data (for summer 
1996 to spring 1997). Given these reservations we do not adjust our baseline figures to take 
account of cohort affects. Future extensions of this work will examine the use of panel 
regressions as a tool to estimate age cohort effects.  
 
Table 10 Cohort Analysis of GCSEs on Wages 
Age 17 18 19 20 21 
 Wage  N  Wage  N  Wage  N  Wage  N  Wage  N 
1996            
Mean wage  70.97 38  98.11 38 121.31 29 122.60 30 142.89 36
Raw difference     0.3209   0.2115  0.0106  0.1528  
Net of experience  63   78.00  87.14  80.23  85.87  
Adjusted difference     0.2128   0.1107  -0.083  0.0679  
1997            
Mean wage  88.88  40  100.92 39 130.63 27 122.93 28 147.91 34
Raw difference      0.127    0.2566   -0.061  0.1845  
Net of experience  78.89    80.24  93.84  80.45  88.89  
Adjusted difference      0.017    0.1562   -0.154  0.0997  
1998            
Mean wage  95.49  76  114.72 89 135.20 71 148.07 57  150.21 47
Raw difference      0.183    0.1639   0.0909   0.0144  
Net of experience  84.76    91.21    97.12  96.90  90.27  
Adjusted difference      0.0733   0.0627   -0.002  -0.071  
 
 
5.3  Changing outcomes: Contributions of Education to raising economic growth 
We now turn to a consideration of changes in the effectiveness of education across time. 
We have already dealt with the use of test score results and argued that without 
information on the extent to which reaching some threshold level raises effectiveness we 
                                                                                                                                                                                
4 A more thorough analysis would use the month of birth and the month interviewed to obtain the exact 
population in the particular cohort, but this example is for illustrative purposes only.  38
cannot use this information in a transparent way. The remainder of this section therefore 
discusses an alternative adjustment based on the impact of education on economic growth. 
 Over time average earnings have risen due to increases in labour productivity. In the 
decade 1990 to 2000 output per hour worked grew at an annual average rate of about 2.1% 
in the UK and 1.5% in the US. A total outcome measure would add these increases in real 
earnings to the growth in volumes at each point in time. But only a part of this increase is 
attributable directly to the education sector. The standard growth accounting method, most 
commonly associated with Dale Jorgenson and collaborators (e.g. as set out in Jorgenson et 
al. (1987)) divides changes in labour productivity into changes in physical capital intensity, 
labour quality and underlying residual productivity, most commonly termed total factor 
productivity (TFP). In this framework the education sector’s impact is in raising labour 
quality through increasing the skills of the workforce. Recent estimates by O’Mahony, 
Robinson and Vecchi (2003) suggest the contribution of skills to labour productivity 
growth from 1990 to 2000 averaged 0.50 percentage points in the UK and 0.20 percentage 
points in the US.  Thus just under a quarter of UK labour productivity growth in that period 
was due to increases in labour force skills whereas it only accounted for about 13% of the 
US labour productivity.  
The final outcome figures in both countries are adjusted to take account of this 
impact on growth. In this first attempt we use this growth accounting estimate to increase 
lifetime earnings by 0.5% per annum in the UK and 0.2% in the US. Thus we are 
modifying the outcome flow measure in a manner equivalent to that set out in equation (9) 
in section 2 above. This is a crude measure in that it we assume the impact is constant 
throughout the decade and a more sophisticated approach will be attempted at a later date. 
It also assumes the impact is equal across education groups. In fact there is ample evidence 
of a skill bias in technological change across time and that this may be linked to adoption  39
of information technology (e.g. see the survey in Chenells and van Reenen, 1999). Thus 
wages of higher skilled workers relative to the unskilled, in particular those with degrees, 
have tended to increase over time. If changes in technology are exogenous then we would 
not wish to attribute these differential earnings impacts to the education sector. On the 
other hand if the education sector has responded to this demand by changing the subjects 
taught to students to reflect increased demand for computer related skills then there is an 
argument for including an adjustment that varies by education level. But in practice 
estimating these impacts would be very difficult and so are not pursued here. Finally the 
growth accounting method is likely to underestimate the impact of skills on growth, if 
there are complementarities between physical capital and skills or if TFP growth is 
affected by increases in human capital through external effects or spillovers. However it is 
difficult to quantify these aspects and so are not attempted here.  
5.4  Inputs and Labour Productivity 
5.4.1  Inputs 
The simplest measure to start with is number of workers. The estimates will vary however 
depending on whether only qualified teachers are included or if we also include auxiliary 
staff including teaching assistants since the latter have been growing rapidly in the UK in 
recent years. Hence total teaching staff have been growing by 0.5% per annum from 1994 
to 2001 whereas teaching auxiliaries have been rising by nearly 6% per annum on average 
over this period, with the growth concentrated in the final few years. An alternative 
measure, and the one in the spirit of the method employed to measure output, is to weight 
each type of staff by their wages rates relative to a base category (primary teachers).   
 Figure 1 plots the growth in total teaching staff, teaching staff including auxiliaries,  
including the latter but with a weight equal 0.5 and the wage weighted alternative. Wage  40
weighting leads to a larger rise in labour input than just using teachers alone but to lower 
increases than either option including auxiliaries (the two dashed lines). In fact the latter 
illustrates the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions employed for auxiliary staff.  
 
 
















5.4.2  Productivity Measures 
In terms of labour productivity, combining the preferred wage weighted measure of labour 
input, with the output measures suggests an annual average growth rate from 1994 and 
2001 of between 0.64% if the volume measure is employed, 0.86% if the earnings outcome 
flow measured is employed as an alternative and 1.36% if the latter is adjusted for the 
impact on economic growth. To put this in context, economy-wide growth in UK labour 
productivity over this time period grew, on average, by 1.44% per annum. Thus labour 
productivity growth in the UK education sector was below the economy-wide measure, but  41
only marginally so using the final measure above. However the economy wide measure 
does not adjust for labour quality so is not directly comparable. It is useful therefore to 
compare the same sector across countries. We now turn to a discussion of US results. 
 
 















6  US Results and international comparisons 
6.1  US Results 
Data for the US on school and college enrollment were downloaded from the National 
Center for Education Statistics web-site. Raw numbers were adjusted to full time 
equivalents to be consistent with the UK figures. Staff numbers and salaries came from the 
same source. Data underlying the lifetime earnings calculations came from the Current 
Population Survey.   42
6.1.1  Outputs and outcomes 
 In terms of international comparisons, the lack of national tests in the US means that it is 
not possible to construct a test score weighted index for that country. International test 
score results tend to be very limited, often confined to a certain age group, e.g. 15-16 year 
olds, and have been subject to definitional changes over time. Therefore for the US we 
only consider the volume and earnings outcomes measures.  
Table 8 shows the discounted lifetime earnings results for the US. In comparison 
with the lowest category, the wage premiums are much greater in the US than those for the 
UK shown in Table 7 above. Proportionally, the greater US premiums are highest at the 
top end of the education distribution.  
 
Table 11 Discounted Lifetime earnings, US. 
  Discounted lifetime earnings* 
 Total  Relative to no 
qualifications 
    
post graduate  $488,224  1.909 
under graduate  $582,830  2.279 
Associate Academic  $474,289  1.854 
Associate vocational   $458,517  1.793 
12
th grade- diploma  $427,160  1.670 
12
th  grade – no diploma  $323,940  1.266 
11
th grade  $283,337  1.108 
No Qualifications < 11
th grade  $255,778  1.000 
* average of male and female earnings 
 
The volume measure of output for the US shows an annual average increase of 
1.03% from 1994 to 2001, which is lower than in the UK. Using the same method as for 
the UK to translate lifetime earnings to education outcomes leads to growth of 1.31 % per 
annum, a significant upward adjustment. The plot of both series in Chart   shows 
increasing divergence across time. 
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6.1.2  Labour Input and Labour productivity 
As for the UK we calculated both a volume measure of labour input (number of full-time 
equivalent teachers and HE staff) and a wage weighted variant. In this case there was only 
a marginal difference between the two calculations with the volume measure increasing by 
2.55% per annum between 1994 and 2001 and the wage weighted measure rising by 
2.49%.  
As with the UK, we also include a variant that adjusts for the impact on economic 
growth, raising the earnings outcome measure by 0.20% per annum.  The net effect of the 
output and input measures is a decline in US labour productivity growth in the last half of 
the 1990s, as shown in Figure 6. Thus on average, the volume measures suggests annual 
declines of 1.47%, the LTE measure of 1.17% and the growth adjusted LTE measure by 
0.97%. 
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6.2  International Comparisons 
Figure 7 plots the annual percent difference between UK and US labour productivity 
growth rates in the education sector, using the growth adjusted outcome measure, and 
compares this with the difference in productivity growth rates in the aggregate economy. In 
Education the UK outperforms the US in all years (the differences are everywhere 
positive) with very high differences in the final two years. In contrast labour productivity 
growth in the total economy was mostly greater in the US than in the UK during these 
years. Hence put in this international context productivity growth in the UK education 






Figure 7 Annual differences in Labour productivity growth rates, (UK-US) 















7  Conclusions and future extensions. 
This paper is a first attempt to consider the performance of the UK education sector in an 
international context. The measure chosen, labour productivity growth, implies that the UK 
outperformed the comparable sector in the US in recent years. But arriving at this result 
involved a number of crude assumptions and further refinements are needed.  
First it would be useful to extend the analysis back in time, e.g. to include the 1980s 
as well as the 1990s. In principle the data required to undertake this extension are available 
but there are practical problems in matching data across time. Thus in the UK case we will 
need to move to using an alternative source to estimate returns to education, since the 
Labour Force Survey only included information on wages from 1993 onwards. An 
alternative source is the General Household Survey which contains data back to the late 
1970s but with some changes across time. The US Current Population Survey does have  46
data on earnings back to 1976 but with a break in educational groups in the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless these data problems are not insurmountable and the researchers will attempt 
to extend the analysis in this way.  
The survey data mentioned above relate to stocks of workers with various 
qualification levels at each point in time.  A more sophisticated framework would attempt 
to attempt to look at flows and incremental changes to lifetime earnings as well as taking 
account of age cohort effects in a panel regression framework to measure changes in 
effectiveness of the education system through time. Finally we plan to extend the analysis 
to other European countries. This will draw on the survey data that have been used to 
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8  Appendices 
Appendix 1  Additional earnings estimation for UK 
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Table 12 Additional Earnings Equations, UK 
(Summer 1998 to Spring 1999) 
Using Heckman Selection Method 
Men Women 








0.11394***   0.08356***   potexp 
(0.00251)   (0.00302)  
-0.00426***   -0.00437***   potexp
2 
(0.00015)   (0.00017)  
0.00005***   0.00007***   potexp
3 
(0.00000)   (0.00000)  
0.08150*** -0.59787*** 0.36069***  -0.67897***  Health 
problem  (0.01320) (0.01678) (0.01685) (0.01590) 
-0.00446 -0.33129*** 0.27180***  -0.34403***  Black 
(0.03283) (0.04543) (0.03836) (0.03960) 
0.03942 -0.37124*** 0.32935***  -0.43160***  Indian 
(0.02932) (0.04074) (0.04005) (0.04014) 
-0.08412** -0.54455*** 0.65663***  -1.04966***  Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi  (0.03820) (0.04907) (0.06564) (0.05800) 
0.05384 -0.52676*** 0.49062***  -0.55658***  Other Asian 
(0.05205) (0.06936) (0.06116) (0.06046) 
0.02329 -0.25835*** 0.42148***  -0.46754***  Mixed 
(0.06056) (0.08298) (0.07417) (0.07441) 
0.19063** -0.63735*** 0.57953***  -0.61977***  Other 
(0.08369) (0.10868) (0.10431) (0.10280) 
0.59860*** 0.58747*** 0.71400*** 0.55253*** 
HE_PG 
(0.02061) (0.03134) (0.02916) (0.03226) 
0.51835*** 0.46083*** 0.55186*** 0.50678*** 
HE_UG 
(0.01494) (0.02105) (0.01844) (0.01898) 
0.13698*** 0.42453*** 0.09353*** 0.48974*** 
FE 
(0.01313) (0.01788) (0.01562) (0.01574) 
0.15540*** 0.18765*** 0.09352*** 0.18148*** 
TRADEAPP 
(0.01499) (0.02070) (0.02943) (0.03039) 
0.29164*** 0.30376*** 0.29188*** 0.35932***  ALEVEL 
(0.01758) (0.02452) (0.02102) (0.02158) 
0.01328 0.39084***  -0.02545* 0.41592***  GCSE 
(0.01413) (0.01948) (0.01547) (0.01562) 
0.73316*** -1.26907*** 1.20224***  -1.11242*** 
DKQUAL 
(0.03391) (0.03554) (0.04407) (0.03722) 
 0.17533***   0.02453**  age 
 (0.01318)   (0.01232) 
 -0.00405***   0.00062*  age
2 
 (0.00037)   (0.00035) 
 0.00003***   -0.00001***  age
3 
 (0.00000)   (0.00000) 
 0.22931***   -0.08884***  married 
 (0.01068)   (0.00824) 
8.77365*** -2.44973*** 8.83269***  -1.01683***  Constant 
(0.01771) (0.14627) (0.02083) (0.13741) 
ρ  -0.87  -0.94  
σ  0.70  0.97  
λ  -0.61 (0.01) -0.92 (0.01) 
χ
2  2183.56  3394.78  
p(χ
2)  0.00  0.00  
Observations  57929  61144  
censored  28175  30070  
•  Standard errors in parentheses     
•  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
•  χ
2 = Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0  51
Table 13 Additional Activity equations, UK 
(Summer 1998 to Spring 1999) 
Multinomial logit (omitted category = in employment) 
  Men Women 
  Unemp Inactivity Unemp Inactivity 
-0.30952*** -0.82446*** -0.17363*** 0.20635***  age 
(0.04446) (0.03569) (0.05476) (0.02525) 
0.00649*** 0.01779*** 0.00352**  -0.00851***  age
2 
(0.00130) (0.00102) (0.00162) (0.00071) 
-0.00004*** -0.00011*** -0.00003* 0.00009***  age
3 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
-1.20281*** -0.76913*** -0.79368*** 0.04615*  Married 
(0.04887) (0.03954) (0.05457) (0.02393) 
1.16001*** 2.80280*** 0.95970*** 1.71260***  Health 
problem  (0.05190) (0.03545) (0.06436) (0.02747) 
0.85164*** 1.14144*** 0.91868*** 0.54300***  Black 
(0.12108) (0.10569) (0.12024) (0.07515) 
0.40098*** 0.70546*** 0.59995*** 0.67699***  Indian 
(0.13604) (0.10319) (0.15017) (0.07096) 
1.05233*** 1.37685*** 1.48856*** 2.09429***  Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi  (0.12522) (0.10227) (0.17908) (0.09403) 
0.52560** 1.69398***  0.57014** 1.15691***  Other Asian 
(0.23970) (0.14896) (0.24846) (0.10331) 
0.57591*** 0.64708*** 1.21377*** 0.67713***  Mixed 
(0.22164) (0.19384) (0.19740) (0.13511) 
1.61750*** 2.24742*** 1.10123*** 1.32847***  Other 
(0.27527) (0.21808) (0.34217) (0.17541) 
-1.68234*** -1.28598*** -0.75494*** -1.80776*** 
HE_PG 
(0.15590) (0.11526) (0.14403) (0.08229) 
-1.26554*** -1.06772*** -0.99350*** -1.54062*** 
HE_UG 
(0.07603) (0.06345) (0.08882) (0.04076) 
-0.88444*** -1.00137*** -0.62574*** -1.22945*** 
FE 
(0.05329) (0.04465) (0.06544) (0.02996) 
-0.94136*** -0.95447*** -0.69314*** -0.72706*** 
TRADEAPP 
(0.07156) (0.05565) (0.15022) (0.05712) 
-1.05940*** -0.05312 -0.93172*** -0.83172***  ALEVEL 
(0.08221) (0.05622) (0.09566) (0.04052) 
-0.99302*** -0.93228*** -0.66771*** -0.91202***  GCSE 
(0.05778) (0.04839) (0.06442) (0.02887) 
-0.87256*** -0.70100*** -0.59792*** -0.91949*** 
DKQUAL 
(0.15381) (0.12476) (0.19614) (0.09166) 
2.96936*** 9.43879*** 0.70079  -1.36583***  Constant 
(0.46881) (0.37928) (0.57032) (0.27672) 
Observations  55366 55366 59387 59387 
•  Standard errors in parentheses      
•  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
 
 
 